INTRODUCTION
This article presents a case for law schools to undertake public interest advocacy. It argues that incorporating public interest advocacy into curricula and research enhances clinical legal education and enables law schools to make a distinctive and valuable contribution to justice and law reform. The article outlines an integrated model for law school based public interest advocacy based on the experience of one of Australia's newest law schools at Newcastle in the Hunter region of New South Wales. The article then describes a recent public interest case undertaken by academics, clinicians and students at Newcastle law school, explaining their participation in the case and exploring the contributions made by the case to legal education, the correction of injustice and reform of the law.
The case, one of Australia's most controversial deaths in custody, concerned the fatal shooting on Bondi Beach in Sydney in June 1997 of French photographer Roni Levi. The article examines the shooting, its investigation by police, a coroner and an independent commission of inquiry. It analyses the flaws in these legal investigations, considers their justice implications, and outlines the legal and policing reforms achieved through the case.
The article concludes with the suggestion that changes in law school culture as well as curriculum are needed to ensure that law schools embrace public interest advocacy and other forms of clinical legal education for the future benefit of the law and its students. inadequate to explain and predict how cases are decided. 16 Indeed, legal determinacy and indeterminacy, and the relations between law and facts are central concerns of modern jurisprudential discourse. 17 Developments in legal education and scholarship, such as those concerned to explore the theory and practice of fact investigation and adjudication in law and the working relationships between law, ethics and justice, have been especially retarded. 18 Legal education is not only important to law students and their teachers. It plays an essential role in shaping 'legal culture', and in determining how well the legal system operates in practice. 19 Achieving systemic reform and maintaining high standards of performance in a legal system, relies on the development of a healthy professional culture that takes justice and ethical concerns seriously. 20 The development of a healthy professional culture should start at law school. Inadequate legal education is a sure foundation for inadequate legal service. 21 For example, inadequate education and training in advocacy produces poor advocates, and 'poor advocacy can prolong proceedings, reduce the quality of decision making and increase costs for clients and the courts and tribunals '. 22 A concern identified in public inquiries and reports into legal services in Australia is that the legal profession "has not contributed as it should have to the practice of justice in Australian democracy". 23 Some commentators have argued that lawyers should take responsibility for creating institutions in which they address community concerns as a quid pro quo of professional Aldershot, 1977 and Goldsmith, AJ 'An Unruly Conjunction? Social Thought and Legal Action in Clinical Legal Education' (1993) 43 Journal of Legal Education 415. 17 Minda, G 'Jurisprudence at Century's End' (1993) Proof, West Publishing Co., St. Paul., Minn. 1984; Anderson, T & Twining, W Analysis of Evidence: How To Do Things With Facts, Weidenfeld and Nicholson, London,1991; Moore, A J, Bergman, P and Binder, Trial Advocacy: Inferences, Arguments and Trial Techniques West Publishing Co., St. Paul, Minn.,1996; Robertson, BA & Vignaux, GA Conference, London, 8 July 1996 pp.27-34 at p. 33. 22 Australian Law Reform Commission 'Review of the Federal Civil Justice System', Discussion Paper 62, August 1999 para 3.35. 23 Parker, Christine 'Justifying the New South Wales Legal Profession 1976 to 1997 ' (1997 self-regulation. 24 Others argue that improvements in the regulation and delivery of professional legal services will require 'nurturing an internal catalyst of change within the profession itself '. 25 Others have pointed to the need to encourage lawyers to undertake pro bono legal service and have suggested educational and other initiatives to foster the development of a pro bono culture in the legal profession to achieve this end. 26 Notwithstanding the recommendations of many reports into legal education, the contentions of many academics and legal practitioners, and the teachings of many divergent schools of modern jurisprudence, many law schools continue to maintain their distance from the practice of law . Only recently have some Australian law schools become involved in the direct provision of practical legal training, mainly in the form of 'add-on' programs available after the completion of the LLB degree . Only a few have attempted to integrate practical legal skills and legal ethics within the basic law degree program .
Most Australian law schools have not only omitted practical skills from their curricula but have also failed to actively support and encourage their academic staff and students to participate directly in the legal process. 30 Many academics have made important contributions to law reform by way of submissions, and sometimes by membership of law reform agencies. Others have made significant contributions to test cases in appellate courts. Countless law school academics and students have supported community legal centres through their individual labour. Some law schools co-operate with community legal centres in the provision of client clinics that students may elect to participate in under supervision for academic credit. 31 However, most Australian law schools have not encouraged staff and student participation in legal practice as an integral part of their teaching and research programs.
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24 Parker, Stephen Islands of Civic Virtue? Lawyers and Civil Justice Reform, Inaugural Professional Lecture, Griffith University Brisbane 1996 p.42-25 and Parker, Stephen ' Competing Images of the Legal Profession: Competing Regulatory Strategies' (1997) 25 International Journal of the Sociology of Law 385-409. 25 Parker, Christine 'Justifying the New South Wales Legal Profession 1976 to 1997 ' (1997 As 'a clinical law school', Newcastle seeks to integrate learning of the theory and practice of law.
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Curriculum and research, people and partnerships, are the keys to integration.
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The critical aspects of integration at Newcastle are: the inclusion of generic skills, ethical ideals and jurisprudence in the core undergraduate law program; the creation of the University of Newcastle Legal Centre, the development of its partnerships with other legal service providers and the No. 89, Sydney, 2000, Australian Law Reform Commission para. 2.85 integral role of the Centre and its partners in the delivery of the law school's teaching and research program; the availability of a 'professional program' as a course of study, skills development and clinical placement to law students in the undergraduate law program; the provision of opportunities for voluntary (pro bono) legal practice at the University of Newcastle Legal Centre for law students; and the inclusion in the elective program of applied legal subjects which emphasise skills development, including public interest advocacy.
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The Curriculum and Research Program
When the Faculty of Law at Newcastle was established a group of its founding academics encouraged the University to embark upon a clinical legal education program. 39 The Faculty offers two undergraduate LLB streams 40 -a degree stream (LLB) and a professional program stream (LLB/Diploma of Legal Practice). A core program is undertaken by students in both the degree and professional program streams. 41 The professional program, completed over the final two years of undergraduate study, earns students an LLB degree and a Diploma of Legal Practice and entitles them to apply for admission to legal practice without the need for further practical training. The program integrates legal learning, skills and clinical placement. Students who take this program undertake clinical placement at the University of Newcastle Legal Centre, the Legal Aid Commission or the Many Rivers Aboriginal Legal Service, and may undertake placement with a private legal firm or public law office. The professional program at Newcastle is currently the only fully integrated clinical degree program available in Australia.
Legal research at Newcastle includes clinical research involved in public interest cases. Clinical research, evolving out of academic, practitioner and student planning for and reflection upon individual cases, is a critical part of the dynamic of public interest advocacy. 42 Research enhances not only the quality of the advocacy of an individual case but also the prospects of achieving more general reform outcomes, and takes many forms. 
Staff and Students
Upon the foundation of its law school Newcastle University formulated a recruitment profile for the school's academic staff that would support the delivery of an integrated clinical program. Staff were chosen from a mixture of academic and practical backgrounds. Some staff came from pure academic backgrounds; others had a combination of academic and practice backgrounds; others had purely legal practice backgrounds. Staff with a background of practice were encouraged to continue to practice in order to enhance the Faculty's teaching and research programs. Pure academic staff were encouraged to collaborate with those working in the clinical teaching and research programs. The inclusion of practising lawyers, both solicitors and barristers, as academic members of the law school, was an essential step in providing Newcastle's clinical program.
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Their proven ability to practice, their skills and experience, and their knowledge of and connection to 'law jobs' 45 were essential to support the clinical program. The Faculty was founded on the policy that clinical staff of the Centre should be members of the academic staff of the law school and their distinctive teaching and research efforts should be recognised equally with those of mainstream academic staff. 46 The Faculty's core of full time teachers was complemented by parttime clinical teachers drawn from the judiciary and the profession.
Law schools are often depicted as training schools for anti-social, or at least self-interested, legal practice. They are often seen as training grounds for an elite who go on to earn enormous salaries serving commercial interests rather than engage their skills in the pursuit of justice and the public interest. There is a considerable body of legal educational literature and empirical research that suggests that the overall effect of law school is to inculcate cynicism about legal ideals and even to reorient students' personal values and commitment. 48 The literature contains many reports of students who come to law school with ideals of doing justice but who fail to follow their ideals through in their course choices, career choices, and, ultimately, in the attitudes and approaches they bring to their chosen legal work.
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Public interest advocacy at Newcastle developed, in part, in response to traditional law school practices that impart or compound legal cynicism. It engages law students to provide access to justice and encourages their deeper consideration of the relationship between law and justice. Student interest in and commitment to public interest case work at Newcastle is generous and sustained.
Partnerships with the Profession
The University of Newcastle Legal Centre has grown from seeds sown by community legal centres. 50 It shares many of the aspirations and methods of these centres. However, the Newcastle Centre holds a distinctive place in both the public interest practice of law and legal education in Australia. Established as a centerpiece of the University's undertaking to provide integrated teaching and research programs in law and practice, it is truly a law school based legal centre.
Newcastle Law School has extended and consolidated its clinical program through collaboration with the Legal Aid Commission of New South Wales and the Many Rivers Aboriginal Legal Service. Lawyers employed by the Commission and Many Rivers work alongside lawyers from the Centre to provide legal aid services to the community and act as clinical supervisors to law students who assist them with their cases. 51 Many people come to the Centre with complaints of injustice. ' Juris Doctor December 1976 p. 34; Erlanger, H. and Klegon, D. (1978) , 'Socialising Effects of Professional School: The Law School Experience and Student Orientations to Public Interest Concerns' (1978) 13 Law and Society Review 11; Erlanger, H, Epp, C, Cahill, M. and Haines, K. 'Law Student Idealism and Job Choice: Some New Data on an Old Question', (1996) 30A Law and Society Review, 85; Reidel, C 'Public Interest Law: A Growing Commitment: A Shrinking Market National (1996) Jurist 38; Gunier, L et al (1994) 'Becoming Gentlemen: Women's Experience at One Ivy League Law School" (1994) Many receive assistance. However, resources are limited and its educational objectives mean that only some cases can be undertaken as public interest advocacy cases.
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PUBLIC INTEREST ADVOCACY AT NEWCASTLE LAW SCHOOL
Public interest advocacy is taught and practised at Newcastle law school as a form of clinical legal education. 53 At the heart of clinical legal education is a real client. It is the presence of a real client that distinguishes clinical legal education both from traditional legal education, which may often be conducted without any reference to a 'client', and from practical legal skills training, which hypothesises or simulates client situations. 54 Clinical legal education exposes students to real, factual problems requiring real solutions. As Hugh Brayne has observed, 'good judges and good lawyers use a combination of legal knowledge, analytical powers, insights, experience, and understanding of human nature to make difficult decisions in a practical and wise way. '. 55 Law students engaged in public interest advocacy gain personal experience of the impact of law on individuals. Under the collaborative guidance and supervision of academics and practitioners, students who learn by assisting others construct a foundation for personal growth towards becoming 'good lawyers'.
Public interest advocacy at Newcastle brings together a team of academics, practitioners and law students to work on individual cases that raise fundamental concerns about the administration of justice. Given the educational and research missions of the University, public interest advocacy at the law school has a number of related objectives, including encouraging student learning, inspiring research and analysis, and promoting improvements in the law. The suitability of a case for public interest advocacy at Newcastle is assessed according to a matrix of considerations. Typically, supervisors ask whether a case is likely to: confront students with a real case of injustice which will challenge them to fashion effective legal responses; demonstrate the practical contribution which lawyers can make to fundamental democratic and legal values, including the protection of individuals and groups from the abuse of public and private power; 56 stimulate research and learning of substantive law , reinforce traditional student skills, 58 foster practical legal skills, and cultivate qualities required of 'good lawyers' 59 ; and encourage students to reflect upon the moral and ethical dimensions of law and how law ought to be practised.
Law School Based Public Interest Advocacy: An Australian Story
Students undertake public interest advocacy either as volunteers (pro bono), or on clinical placement with the Legal Centre as part of the professional program, or enrolled in "Public Interest Advocacy", an optional subject in the LLB program. Each student is engaged on an individual public interest case as part of a team, under the supervision and guidance of a clinician and an academic co-ordinator. Each student member of a public interest advocacy team engages, in different ways, with the client and with fact gathering and analysis, legal research, case-management, preparation of 'pre-trial' materials (including the formulation of case theories and issues and relevant and probative lines of examination and cross-examination), 'trial' presentation (including the formulation of opening and closing addresses and written submissions) and follow up. Some students instruct in court during a hearing, others are engaged in formulating questions as the hearing progresses, and reviewing the evidence at the end of each hearing day, and formulating final submissions. The common cause of injustice in the public interest cases conducted by the Centre is investigative failure. According to Jeremy Bentham, "the basis of justice is evidence". 69 Many cases of injustice occur because legal process fails to discover the full facts or because false facts are accepted by it as true. Justice can only be done when the facts are truly known. Correct application of the law to produce justice depends on sound and reliable fact gathering and evaluation. Not even the most rigorous examination of facts at trial, nor flawless legal analysis on appeal, can rectify flawed or inadequate pre-trial investigation of the facts. 70 The contribution of law school based public interest advocacy to the exposure of flawed investigation, leading to systemic change in legal process is exemplified by the Levi case. a kitchen knife. The flatmate ran outside, and shortly thereafter, to the nearby Bondi police station to alert police.
The Cases
PUBLIC INTEREST ADVOCACY AND THE POLICE SHOOTING OF RONI LEVI The Shooting and Its Investigation
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A senior sergeant, Podesta, Dilorenzo and another other Bondi police officer set out to search for Levi in three separate vehicles. Podesta, Dilorenzo and the other officer spotted Levi near Bondi beach at about five past seven, and chased him down the beach and into the water. The senior sergeant did not join his men on the beach but set up a 'command post' to oversee the situation from the promenade, overlooking the beach. Not long after he set up his post, the senior sergeant was joined by a fifth Bondi officer and two officers from Paddington who had heard a call for assistance on the radio in their patrol van. These three officers joined Podesta, Dilorenzo and the other Bondi officer on the beach with Levi. At times Levi was fully immersed in the surf. At other times the police on the beach and the senior sergeant on the promenade could see that Levi was pointing the blade of the knife towards himself. When he saw that Levi might harm himself with the knife the senior sergeant on the promenade called for an ambulance. Police on the beach surrounding Levi later called for police negotiators.
After a time Levi emerged from the water on to the beach. He walked up and down the shoreline shadowed by police who at times had their pistols drawn. 73 Police repeatedly called upon Levi to drop the knife. According to police accounts they were positive but firm. According to civilian eyewitnesses they were much tougher and direct. 'Put down the knife you fucking dickhead'. And to a female jogger who inadvertently came near, 'Fuck off'.
74
All the officers confronting Levi formed the impression that he was mentally unstable and not communicating rationally. One said that they thought that Levi 'might've lost the plot'. Another said he reminded him of a mentally ill patient he once had to deal with. 76 One officer called to Levi 'let's go up the beach and have a talk. No one is going to hurt you'.
77 Still Levi did not respond. Another officer attempted to strike Levi's arm to dislodge the knife with a baton. Levi started to move in a westerly direction towards the promenade. The police attempted to contain Levi by forming a semi-circle around him with their pistols drawn. The same officer again tried to strike Levi with a baton, and again missed. Levi kept advancing towards the promenade with the police surrounding him.
The police dealing with Levi were each equipped with guns. However, they had only two 'long' batons between them and they did not have capsicum spray. Police authorities had for some years been considering equipping officers with capsicum spray and replacing 'long' batons with extendable batons. Capsicum spray can be used to disable a person. 'Long' batons are cumbersome and carried in police vehicles, not as part of an officer's personal equipment. 'Long' batons were often left behind in the heat of the moment. For this reason extendable batons, lighter, portable, and designed to be worn alongside a gun on an officer's belt had been under consideration but were still not in use by the New South Wales Police Service at the time of the Bondi incident. All the officers on Bondi beach left their 'long' batons behind in their vehicles. During the incident, as an afterthought, one of the officers returned to the senior officer at the command post on the promenade and collected two batons from the five police vehicles parked there to take down on to the beach. This officer was the only officer who engaged a baton in an attempt to deal with Levi.
The senior sergeant on the promenade could communicate by radio with the officers on the beach to give advice or receive their requests for assistance and with command headquarters to obtain any additional assistance to deal with the situation. However, throughout the incident, the senior sergeant did not communicate with his officers on the beach. Police negotiators, especially trained to deal with difficult situations, were not called until 7.21 am, but were expected to arrive within minutes of that call.
Just as the officer with a baton was going in for a third attempt to dislodge the knife from Levi, Podesta and Dilorenzo fired four shots. It appears that Podesta, the most inexperienced officer facing Levi, fired first. His first shot hit Levi in the chest, his second shot hit Levi in the lower back, when Levi was facing away from him. Dilorenzo's shots hit Levi in the chest. When they fired their guns Podesta and Dilorenzo were facing Levi with their backs towards the promenade. Levi was shot about thirty metres from the promenade at about 7.30 am, some ten minutes after negotiators were first alerted by police central communications to go to Bondi beach. The whole incident lasted about thirty five to forty minutes. The police officers who witnessed Podesta and Dilorenzo fire at Levi gave estimates to the Coroner of the distance between the shooters and Levi ranging from two to three metres. Many of the thirty nine civilian eye witnesses estimated that distance to be three metres or more. A police crime scene examiner arrived on the beach within minutes of the incident. He determined the location of the shooters from discussions with one on the officers involved in the incident immediately after it had occurred and while that officer was still on the beach. He determined Levi's location from his observations of disturbed sand, Levi's blood stains in the disturbed sand and the nearby location of the knife which had been dislodged from Levi's hand after he was shot. He estimated that Podesta and Dilorenzo had been 5.2 metres from Levi when they discharged their firearms. But this estimate by the crime scene examiner was relegated to his notebook, and not included in his statement to the Coroner.
Only two of the thirty nine civilian eye witnesses described Levi as "lunging" or otherwise attacking the two officers when they shot him. But each of these witnesses had been interviewed by Bondi police officers who were close colleagues of the shooters and whose involvement in the investigation was in breach of police instructions designed to ensure the integrity of evidence collected in police investigations of police shootings.
According to Podesta and Dilorenzo, Levi lunged at them with the knife and tried to kill them. Podesta said that Levi was about one and a half to two metres away when he fired. Dilorenzo said that Levi was about a foot from his chest with the knife when he fired. Dilorenzo believed his back was, almost literally, against the wall. Both said they were concerned for the welfare of the spectators on the promenade. Both believed that Levi wanted to commit suicide by having police shoot him. These were their accounts, and the reasons they gave for firing their guns, when interviewed by police on the day of the shooting.
Unknown to police, Levi's presence on the beach attracted the attention of a photographer . The photographer took a series of still photographs of the incident, including the very moment of the fatal shooting. These photographs, published the next morning on the front page of a Sydney newspaper, were later provided to the police. However, the police involved in the shooting were unaware of the photographer's presence, and unaware that photographs of the incident had been taken when they made their statements about the shooting. The photographs were to play an important part in attracting public attention to the shooting and as evidence at the coronial inquest.
A coronial inquest serves several functions, including investigation of the cause of death, preliminary determination of any criminal responsibility, and prevention. It is the explicit preventative function, expressed through recommendations directed to reduce the likelihood of a similar death to that under inquiry, which gives the coronial inquest a unique place in the Australian legal system. 82 Preparation for the Levi inquest therefore included not only detailed analysis of the facts preceding and attending the shooting but also consideration of the implications of other inquests and inquiries into police shootings and police conduct.
The Royal Commission into the New South Wales Police Service handed down its final report six weeks before the Levi shooting. 83 The Royal Commission conducted hearings and made findings and observations in relation to the use and supply of illegal drugs by police officers stationed at Bondi police station. 84 In the light of these findings and observations, and as part of its preparation for the inquest, the Centre sought from the Crown, unsuccessfully, information relating to the backgrounds and activities of the Bondi police officers involved in the Levi shooting.
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The State Coroner, as required by law, and assisted by an investigation team of senior crime police, assumed responsibility for the investigation of the Levi case within hours of the shooting.
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Significantly (and as discussed later), information uncovered subsequently by the Police Integrity Commission that Podesta and Dilorenzo were both under internal police investigation in relation to illicit drugs at the time of the shooting, was not provided to the investigating police, or to the State Coroner, when the investigation was commenced.
At the inquest, Cavanagh, as counsel for Ms Dundas, draw extensively on the preparatory work of students, to cross examine the shooting incident police, civilian witnesses, police commanders, 87 and police investigators. At the conclusion of the inquest, Cavanagh submitted that the coroner should recommend to government a number of reforms intended to improve hospital management of patients, avoid future deaths at the hands of police and improve the integrity and raise the standards of investigation of deaths in custody. The Coroner referred the shooting to the Director of Public Prosecutions, 88 and handed down a number of recommendations for reforms in the law and hospital and police procedures. 
The Police Integrity Commission
In part, because of concern that the decision of the Director of Public Prosecutions was undermined by the initial police investigative failure, the Centre submitted a detailed report to the Police Integrity Commission on the shooting and its subsequent investigation. 91 The report contended that important evidence and matters relating to the shooting were not considered or fully investigated by police prior to the inquest. It maintained that a series of investigative failures compromised the integrity of the shooting investigation and raised serious doubts about the thoroughness and reliability of the evidence obtained by police, produced at the inquest, and available to the Coroner and the Director of Public Prosecutions.
The report called upon the Commission to reinvestigate the shooting, investigate whether Podesta or Dilorenzo were using or involved in the supply of illicit drugs prior to the shooting, and whether they were affected by drugs or alcohol at the time of the shooting. The report also called upon the Commission to consider whether police corruption, serious misconduct or incompetence had tainted the investigation of the shooting and caused a miscarriage of justice. As the report pointed out, the officers who shot Levi would be guilty of a crime if they fired without lawful justification. Consequently, failures in the investigation of the shooting may have caused a miscarriage of justice. A miscarriage of justice may result from a failure to properly investigate or prosecute particular types of persons, whether through bias, political manipulation, corruption or incompetence.
92 Flawed police investigation, usually works against an accused person. As the report pointed out, however, in the case of a police shooting investigated by police, investigative flaws are likely to operate in favour of police shooters and to reduce their prospect of being found guilty of unlawful homicide.
Some time after the Centre provided its report to the Commission, the Commission conducted hearings into allegations that some members of the New South Wales Police service were associating with suppliers of prohibited drugs and were involved in the use and supply of prohibited drugs. 93 Senior Constable Anthony Dilorenzo and Rodney Podesta 94 were the subject of investigation and inquiry by the Commission at these hearings. At the hearings it was revealed that Podesta and Dilorenzo were the subjects of police Internal Affairs' drugs surveillance. One period of surveillance of Podesta coincided with the inquest. 95 A period of surveillance of Dilorenzo occurred shortly after the inquest. 96 The surveillance tapes, questions arising from them, and Levi, Bondi Beach, 28 June, 1997, 23 September, 1998. 92 Walker, C and Starmer, K, ed questions arising from other aspects of police Internal Affairs Commission investigations were put to Podesta and Dilorenzo at these hearings.
Rodney Podesta confessed to drug use apparently revealed by police surveillance of him during the inquest 97 and to drug use not long before and around that time. Podesta confessed only to using and dealing in drugs in the period after the Levi shooting.
98 Podesta also confessed to participating in the supply of cocaine apparently revealed by the same police surveillance of him. Podesta was charged and convicted in relation to supplying a prohibited drug on this occasion 99 and was sentenced to four months periodic detention.
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At these hearings, and subsequently, Dilorenzo denied any involvement in the use or supply of illegal drugs or any other wrongdoing. However, Dilorenzo was removed from the police service pursuant to s. 181D of the Police Service Act 1900, NSW.
101 Such removal is not a dismissal from the service and has the same effect under the Act as resignation or retirement. The Commission's report revealed details of the investigation of Podesta and Dilorenzo's association with illicit drug use and supply. In May 1996 the Internal Affairs Branch of the New South Wales Police Service had begun an investigation of Anthony Dilorenzo in relation to alleged improper association with drug dealers. In May 1997 Internal Affairs had commenced an investigation into Rodney Podesta's alleged use and supply of prohibited drugs and joined this investigation with that of its investigation into Anthony Dilorenzo. Both officers were still under investigation in relation to drug related allegations at the time of their shooting of Levi, however, as the Commission reported, neither officer was tested for drugs or alcohol following the incident. The Commission found that Podesta: (i) used prohibited drugs, including cocaine and ecstasy, prior to his joining the police force; (ii) continued to regularly use cocaine and ecstasy whilst a serving police officer, between the time he joined the force in May 1995 until the time he left the force in March 1998, including the periods just prior to and after the shooting; (iii) supplied cocaine on several occasions whilst a serving police officer; and (iv) improperly associated with Mark Dilorenzo (the brother of Anthony Dilorenzo), a convicted drug supplier, whilst Podesta was a serving police officer, including in the period just prior to the shooting. 107 Based on evidence before it the Commission recommended that consideration be given to the prosecution of Podesta for suppling cocaine. The Commission added that, had Podesta not resigned from the police service, it would have recommended that consideration be given to his removal from the service, having regard to his use and supply of prohibited drugs whilst a serving police officer.
The Commission found that Anthony Dilorenzo used cocaine with Podesta on a number of occasions some months prior to the shooting and was involved in the use of prohibited drugs with another person at a time after the shooting. The Commission added that, had Dilorenzo not been dismissed from the police service because the Commissioner of Police had lost confidence in his suitability to continue as a police officer, it would have recommended that consideration be given to his removal from the service.
The Commission found that police had received information from a number of sources after the shooting alleging that Podesta and/or Dilorenzo were affected by drugs and/or alcohol the evening before the shooting. It found that some of this information had been inadequately investigated and some of it had been "effectively lost" by police investigators. 108 The Commission acknowledged that these lost investigatory opportunities supported "legitimate concerns that a proper investigation of the shooting had not been undertaken".
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The Commission's investigations uncovered a number of individuals able to give evidence about Podesta and Dilorenzo's activities on the evening before the shooting. However, two witnesses who may have been able to provide relevant evidence died after the shooting and before the Commission's hearings. In the result, only one witness testified to seeing Podesta apparently under the influence of drugs on the evening before the shooting.
A former girlfriend of Podesta's testified that Podesta had visited her home late that evening, that he appeared to be "high on cocaine", and that he had told her that he had been using cocaine. 110 However, Podesta's claim that he was with friends and relatives on that evening was supported by the evidence of two long standing friends and his mother. The Commission was "not comfortably satisfied that the account [of the former girlfriend of Podesta] is correct".
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The Commission concluded that the information that it had been able to recover or obtain, almost four years after the shooting, could not support a finding that either Podesta or Dilorenzo were affected by alcohol and/or drugs at the time of the incident.
The Commission criticised many other aspects of the investigation of the shooting. It found, for example, that no "orderly or structured control was taken of the shooting immediately after it Law School Based Public Interest Advocacy: An Australian Story 27 107 Police Integrity Commission, Report to Parliament, Operation Saigon, 15 June, 2001 . p. 56. 108 Police Integrity Commission, Report to Parliament, Operation Saigon, 15 June, 2001 . p. iv. 109 Police Integrity Commission, Report to Parliament, Operation Saigon, 15 June, 2001 occurred [and] that there was a systemic failure to comply with the then procedures [for the investigation of a police shooting], and there was a real risk that such an important investigation may have been carried out by officers who might be perceived as not being at arm's length from Podesta and Dilorenzo". 112 The Commission concluded, however, that the deficiencies in the investigation, while serious, were not "due to corruption or misconduct, merely confusion and misunderstanding". 113 The Commission observed that the Levi case was "a powerful example of the necessity for an effective system of drug and alcohol testing of police officers involved in critical incidents…. if both officers had been drug tested after the incident, there would be no doubts as to whether they were affected by drugs and alcohol at the time".
114 A statutory power to conduct random or targeted drug and alcohol tests of police officers had existed since January 1997, but there was no statutory power at the time of the Levi shooting requiring officers involved in critical incidents to provide samples for drug and alcohol tests and random drug testing had not been implemented. 115 The Commission maintained that the law should allow for, and require the obtaining of, the best evidence for the purpose of drug and alcohol testing of a police officer following a critical incident. It therefore recommended that blood testing of a police officer following a critical incident be introduced. The Commission also recommended the immediate commencement of random drug testing for the New South Wales Police Service. 116 On the same day these recommendations were tabled in Parliament, the government announced that it accepted them and would introduce legislation to give effect to them.
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Investigative Failure in the Levi Case
The investigative failures in the Levi case, detailed in the Centre's reports and submissions to the Police Integrity Commission or revealed by the Commission's report, include the following:
-No independent government agency investigated the shooting: the investigation of the circumstances leading to and involved in the shooting was carried out by the police.
-Contrary to the Police Commissioner's instructions for the investigation of a police shooting, the investigation team included a number of police officers who were close working colleagues of the police involved in the shooting.
-The methods employed by police to gather evidence, particularly the obtaining of statements, cast serious doubt upon the reliability of that evidence. For example, contrary to standard practice for the investigation of a fatal shooting, key eye witnesses to the shooting were not interviewed. Instead, police eye witnesses were allowed to prepare their own statements. They did this after talking to each other and to the two officers who shot Levi.
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-The manner in which police investigators obtained statements from civilian eye witnesses may have adversely affected the reliability of some civilian evidence. For example, some civilian eye witnesses were interviewed by Bondi police officers contrary to the Police Commissioner's Instructions.
-Media statements about the shooting made by senior police shortly after the shooting may also have affected the reliability of some of the civilian evidence.
Levi and Justice
The resources available to the State, the investigating police and the police under investigation in any inquiry into a death in custody dwarf those available to the victim. 119 Law school based public interest advocacy on behalf of Levi's widow helped to alleviate the disparity in the Levi case. Exposure of the flaws in the investigation of the shooting commenced with the initial examination and analysis of the police brief of evidence by the Newcastle public interest advocacy team. More flaws in the police investigation were exposed when police investigators were cross-examined at the inquest by Cavanagh, assisted by his student team. Deeper problems arising from the drug associations of the officers who shot Levi came to light only after the Police Integrity Commission conducted independent investigations, assisted by the information, analysis and research of the submissions made to it by the Newcastle team.
The Centre's reports and submissions and the Commission's report reveal how a flawed police investigation may compromise an inquest and the exercise of a prosecutor's discretion. As the Commission observed, the pattern of police investigative failure in the Levi case, kindled "legitimate concerns that a proper investigation of the shooting had not been undertaken".
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However, as the Commission also observed, it did not address or was unable to satisfactorily resolve many of the questions arising from Levi's very public death in police custody.
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Despite the scrutiny by the Coroner, the Director of Public Prosecutions, the Commission, and the work of the public interest advocacy team on behalf of Ms Dundas, it remains the case that, as a result of the initial investigative failures on the part of the police, the truth about the Levi shooting may never be known and justice may never be done. 
Law School Based Public Interest Advocacy: An Australian Story
Law Student Participation in the Levi Case
Students contributed to the Levi case by carrying out essential investigative and legal research tasks and drew deep lessons from their contribution. Especially lessons about investigative failure and injustice which may result from it.
Over sixty Newcastle law students actively participated in the Levi case. 122 In preparation for the coronial inquest into Levi's death, students attended briefing sessions with the lawyers in charge of the case and undertook various supervised tasks of fact gathering, research and analysis. These tasks included: perusal and analysis of the police brief of evidence; analysis of media material relating to the shooting; background preparation of material for lines of crossexamination. They also included fact gathering, legal and policy research relating to, amongst other things: the jurisdiction, powers and functions of the coroner, especially the recommendations function; other inquests and inquiries into police shootings; police training and procedures in relation to the use of firearms; police training and procedures in relation to the mentally ill; hospital practices and protocols in relation to 'absconding' patients; drug and alcohol screening for police.
In preparing submissions for the Police Integrity Commission, students carried out analyses and prepared material covering a number of areas. Students carried out research and analyses into the nature of contemporary police corruption; 123 compliance by police investigators with the Police Commissioner's Instructions relating to the investigation of a death in custody and the implications of any non-compliance for the integrity of the investigation in the Levi case; the record of police investigative failure in the Levi case and its implications for coronial and prosecutorial decision making; the identification and analysis of the opportunities arising in the course of the investigation of the shooting for the police involved in the shooting to collude on their stories and the implications of any such opportunities for the reliability of the police evidence; the implications of the failure to test the officers involved in the shooting for drugs and alcohol; the record of police/media communications relating to the shooting and its implications for the proper administration of justice.
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A principal educational objective of student participation in the Levi case was to assist students to develop the kinds of cognitive skills necessary to undertake sound investigation and management of facts in law.
125 Much legal process is devoted to fact adjudication, where the law is clear and undisputed. Facts also underpin the exercise of discretionary judgements in law. Facts are also critical in appellate rule-making. Consequently, contemporary legal educators have challenged academics in law schools to take facts more seriously. 126 'New evidence' scholars have attempted to formulate theories and conceptual frameworks for understanding the nature, functions and practices of fact gathering and proof in legal process.
127 Despite these advances, the processes of fact-finding and evaluation remain neglected areas of legal discourse, education, and research.
Students involved in the Levi case were challenged to address and provide the most intellectually rigorous answers to a series of questions about facts and law that actually confronted the legal decision makers in the case. These decision makers included the Coroner, the Director of Public Prosecutions, the Police Integrity Commission, other lawyers and the police. Students were also encouraged to reflect on the nature and significance of these questions and the alternative answers available to them.
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Levi Reforms
At the conclusion of the inquest into Levi's death the coroner made a number of recommendations for reform of the law and police and hospital procedures.
129
The Coroner recommended that all hospital policies and procedures manuals, including nursing manuals, should include a protocol dealing with all patient abscondments. He recommended that such a protocol should address, particularly, notification of the family, security and, in appropriate cases, notification of police, for abscondments which occur without any forewarning.
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The coroner recommended a number of reforms in the law, protocols and policies relating to drug testing of police officers, the conduct of investigations of deaths in custody, and police training and resources. The Coroner's recommendations relating to the investigation of deaths as a result of a police shooting and the background to them were as follows: & Nicholson, London, 1991; Twining, W, Rethinking Evidence, Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1990 Logic, Psychology, and General Experience, and Illustrated in Judicial Trials, 1937; Tillers, P & Green, E D (eds) Probability and Inference in the Law of Evidence, Dordrecht, Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1988; Anderson, T & Twining, W Analysis of Evidence: How To Do Things With Facts, Weidenfeld and Nicholson, London,1991; Twining, W Rethinking Evidence: Exploratory Essays Blackwell 1990; Twining, W and Stein, A Evidence and Proof Dartmouth, Aldershot, 1992; Wells WAN Natural Logic: Judicial Proof and Objective Facts, Federation Press, Sydney, 1994; Roberts, Graham Evidence: Proof and Practice LBC Information Services, Sydney, 1998 (especially Levi, D.W. Hand, State Coroner, Glebe, 11 March, 1998. • The scene of a police shooting should be attended by an Assistant Commissioner of Police to ensure that proper investigative procedures are followed and necessary resources are provided for the investigation.
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• Investigators should take special care to ensure all police eyewitnesses are interviewed properly.
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• No police officer, other than the officer in charge of the investigation or his delegate, should make any statement to the media in relation to a police shooting resulting in a death.
• Police investigators should be required to thoroughly check ERISP tapes before and after an interview. • The Coroner's recommendations relating to drug testing and police training and resources were as follows:
• Legislation should be amended to provide for police officers involved in a fatal shooting to be mandatorily alcohol/drug tested as soon as possible following such an incident.
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• Police training in dealing with mentally ill persons should be reviewed and constantly updated and reinforced with police officers.
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• Police service proposals to introduce capsicum spray and extendable batons be expedited. police officer following a critical incident recommended the introduction of blood testing of a police officers following a critical incident. The Commission also recommended the immediate commencement of random drug testing for the New South Wales Police Service. Each of these recommendations was accepted and acted upon by government.
However, the Levi case has highlighted the need for further and deeper structural and institutional reforms of the criminal and civil justice systems in New South Wales. These reforms are still outstanding. They include an overhaul of the State Coroner's Office and the substitution of an independent agency for the police in future investigations of deaths in custody.
The coronial system in New South Wales has been described as, "the proverbial poor relation in the administration of justice in NSW". 145 There have been many calls for a major overhaul of the coronial system; to upgrade the status and resources of the Coroner's office, to improve its fact finding capacity, to provide greater access to and assistance for relatives of victims, to reform the coroner's powers and procedures to give greater emphasis and efficacy to the preventative role of an inquest and improve monitoring and implementation of coronial recommendations.
146 At least one commentator has drawn attention to the absence from the coronial system of mechanisms for independent or public interest representation in cases raising issues of major public concern.
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The Levi case highlights the limitations of current coronial practice and underscores the need for a systemic overhaul of the New South Wales Coroner's Office. A modern coronial system needs to discharge its investigative, preventative and educative functions to the highest standards. This requires the assembly of an independent specialist team of legal, medical, police and scientific investigators under the guidance and direction of a State Coroner with the status of a Supreme Court judge. Only such a specialised and autonomous institution, properly resourced in terms of skills and infrastructure, is able to provide a fair and adequate, thorough and caring community response to questionable death. A response which will truly "speak for the dead to protect the living". In routine coronial inquests, investigations are usually carried out by the police. The police also prepare the brief for the inquest, assist the coroner and secure the attendance of witnesses. In police custody and police shooting cases investigations are usually supervised by counsel assisting, instructed by the Crown Solicitors' office.
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Roni Levi met a very public death at the hands of police, a death witnessed by the media and scores of civilians. The Levi case calls into question the professionalism and integrity of police investigative methods, and the effectiveness of coronial superintendence of police investigators attached to the police service. The police investigation of the Levi shooting, the recommendations made by the coroner relating to such investigations, and the report of the Police Integrity Commission, combine to emphasise the need for more fundamental reforms in the investigation of deaths in custody.
The Royal Commission into the New South Wales Police Service recommended the establishment of a new agency, external to and independent of the police service "with a specific focus upon the investigation of serious police misconduct and corruption"
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That agency has been established as the Police Integrity Commission. 150 The Royal Commission proposed that this new independent agency be responsible for the investigation of a special category of complaints about police matters, namely, 'serious misconduct and corruption ', 151 which should include, "matters in which it is unlikely that there will be public confidence in an internal police investigation (for example, where the complaint relates to death or serious injury in police custody)." 152 The latter recommendation has not been implemented. The Levi case underscores the need for government to implement the Royal Commission's recommendation for the investigation of complaints about deaths in custody to be undertaken, not by police, but by an independent agency such as the Police Integrity Commission and to consider transferring the primary responsibility for the investigation of all future deaths in custody from the police to an independent agency such as the Police Integrity Commission.
CONCLUSION
The Levi case illustrates the educational, justice and reformist role and value of law school based public interest advocacy. However, law school based public interest advocacy is unlikely to develop and contribute to justice and learning about law unless it becomes a part of the teaching and research culture of law schools. Until accepted by the academic system, public interest advocacy will never effectively serve justice, produce legal change and contribute to a better understanding of law itself. The potential for collaboration between law students, academics and practitioners to contribute to the public good is enormous. The future of law school based public interest advocacy will depend, however, upon greater preparedness to take it on, greater recognition of its worth and greater support for its endeavour.
At the start of the 21st century, Newcastle Law School is the only clinical law school in Australia with an integrated approach to clinical legal education. Others are moving to include clinical legal education in their curriculum and there are signs that public interest advocacy and other forms of clinical legal education will move from being fringe dwellers and take a real place in the Antipodean law school of the twenty-first century.
Perhaps the clearest signpost to the future is that placed recently by the Australian Law Reform Commission. The Commission's recommendations included those aimed at encouraging an emphasis in Australian legal education upon legal ethics and high order professional skills (without derogating from the responsibility law schools have to provide students with a grounding in substantive law); a national discipline review and the establishment of an Australian Academy of Law. A national discipline review of legal education in Australia and the establishment of an Australian Academy of Law, as envisaged by the Commission, might be expected to provide foundation and support for the future of clinical legal education in Australia.
However, Australian law schools, like their counterparts throughout the world, will need to change their culture as well as their curriculum to ensure that public interest advocacy and other forms of clinical legal education develop for the public benefit and for that of the law and its students.
William Twining imagined an ideal law school as one, which "gives a high priority to clinical experience". 156 Anthony Amsterdam 157 and, more recently, the Australian Law Reform Commission, have argued that the law school of the 21st century should move away from "a solitary preoccupation with the detailed content of numerous bodies of substantive law" 158 and more effectively integrate clinical legal education and other forms of "properly conceived and executed professional skills training" into their curricula. 159 To do so law schools will need to confine to history Langdell's 19th Century catechism for law students and their teachers that "everything you would wish to know can be obtained from printed books".
160 Law schools will need to take more seriously the 20th Century pedagogy of jurists like Twining and Amsterdam, in order to find a proper place for "learning from the experience of practising law" 161 in the new millennium.
